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Abstract—The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) is
reshaping our lifestyle. With IoT sensors and devices commu-
nicating with each other via the Internet, people can customize
automation rules to meet their needs. Unless carefully defined,
however, such rules can easily become points of security failure
as the number of devices and complexity of rules increase. Device
owners may end up unintentionally providing access or revealing
private information to unauthorized entities due to complex
chain reactions among devices. Prior work on trigger-action
programming either focuses on conflict resolution or usability
issues, or fails to accurately and efficiently detect such attack
chains. This paper explores security vulnerabilities when users
have the freedom to customize automation rules using trigger-
action programming. We define two broad classes of attack—
privilege escalation and privacy leakage —and present a practical
model-checking-based system called SAFECHAIN that detects
hidden attack chains exploiting the combination of rules. Built
upon existing model-checking techniques, SAFECHAIN identifies
attack chains by modeling the IoT ecosystem as a Finite State
Machine. To improve practicability, SAFECHAIN avoids the
need to accurately model an environment by frequently re-
checking the automation rules given the current states, and
employs rule-aware optimizations to further reduce overhead.
Our comparative analysis shows that SAFECHAIN can efficiently
and accurately identify attack chains, and our prototype imple-
mentation of SAFECHAIN can verify 100 rules in less than one
second with no false positives.
Index Terms—Trigger-Action Attack Chains, Privilege Escala-
tion, Information Leakage, Model Checking, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
WE now live in an era with smart technologies that utilizeconnected devices and sensors to automatically adapt,
enhance performance based on prior experience, and use rea-
soning to modify the next behavior [35]. According to a recent
survey [5], around 8.4 billion networked devices are expected
to be in use by 2017 and the projected number escalates to
more than 20 billion by 2020. This speculation indicates that
these Internet of Things (IoT) are already beginning to reshape
our daily lifestyles seamlessly.
Similar to prior advancement in technology, IoT will bring
convenience to our daily lives, at the cost of security and
privacy. As IoT devices are tightly entangled with the physical
world, an adversary in cyberspace can threaten human users’
safety and privacy in the physical world via IoT devices.
The lack of appropriate security mechanisms in IoT has
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already been highlighted in recent news, ranging from cyber
incidents (e.g., hacking smart fridges to send spam emails [4],
compromising smart meters to reduce power bills [16], and
hijacking toys to leak information [7]) to detrimental cyber-
physical threats (e.g., exploiting cardiac devices to induce
inappropriate pacing or shocks [2], injecting a worm on IoT
devices using ZigBee communication to launch a massive city-
wide light disruptions [40], and compromising IoT devices to
disrupt normal power grid operations [41]). As more and more
vulnerabilities are discovered, relying on vendors to patch IoT
devices in a timely manner is insufficient. Additional defenses
must be in place to limit the impact on vulnerable devices.
An interesting feature of IoT is supporting customized
interaction among devices using end-user programming, such
as trigger-action programming [43]. This often takes the form
of “if trigger, then action” and allows users to specify a trigger
that represents a condition and the corresponding action to be
taken whenever that trigger event occurs. Once defined, such
trigger-action rules can be automatically applied without user
involvement. As the number of connected devices multiplies1,
the complexity of interactions among them will also increase
with customized automation. The increasingly complex inter-
dependencies between devices can easily allow for various
attacks, because an adversary controlling one IoT device can
now expand influence to more devices through such inter-
dependencies. Unfortunately, attacks leveraging trigger-action
rules are difficult to detect manually, as device owners may
unintentionally provide access or reveal private information to
unauthorized entities due to complex chain reactions [46].
This work presents an automated prevention system called
SAFECHAIN which identifies exploitable trigger-action at-
tack chains. SAFECHAIN can thus work in conjunction with
methods that support postmortem attack reconstruction from
logs [46], methods that identify errors in individual rules [37],
and methods that resolve conflicts between rules [30]–[33].
We first formulate two classes of attack that exploit trigger-
action rules. The first is privilege escalation, in which an
adversary gains control of more devices than it initially has via
automation rules. For instance, given the rule “if someone is
home, turn on the light”, an attacker who compromises the oc-
cupancy sensor can also affect the status of the lightbulb. The
other attack class is privacy leakage, in which an adversary
learns more information about the devices than it initially has
via automation rules. For example, given the rule “if someone
1The number of connected IoT devices per household are anticipated to
rise to 50 by 2020 [8].
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is home, turn on the light”, an attacker who observes the state
of the lighting device (e.g., the light is publicly observable or
hacked) can infer the status of the occupancy sensor. In other
words, turning the lighting device on and off with respect to
the occupancy of the home leaks information to the adversary.
The attacker can also leverage the combination of multiple
rules to create a chain effect.
To efficiently and accurately identify the two attack classes,
we present SAFECHAIN, a practical system built upon model-
checking techniques and enhanced by domain specific opti-
mizations. SAFECHAIN models the IoT ecosystem as a Finite
State Machine (FSM)2 such that finding an attack can be
reduced to a reachability problem in the FSM. Both static and
dynamic analysis techniques have been used in prior work
to verify IoT automation. Static analysis [42] is often more
efficient but comes with higher false positives as no runtime
information is provided. On the other hand, prior work [30],
[47] that similarly utilizes model-checking tools lacks a clear
and detailed specification, or mostly focuses on resolving
conflicts and making sure individual rules match user intent.
Dynamic analysis, either FSM or symbolic execution [31],
often suffers from scalability problems and needs a reliable
method of modeling the execution environment. Therefore,
we only consider dynamic analysis to be practical unless the
following challenges have been overcome.
Challenge 1: Environment modeling in FSM. As model
checking verifies properties against a given “model,” an in-
accurate model may miss detection or create false alarms.
Accurately modeling environment variables (e.g., trajectory of
a user and temperature) is nevertheless challenging because it
requires extensive knowledge about physical environments. In-
stead of aiming to create an accurate environment model (e.g.,
using differential equations and control theory), SAFECHAIN
relaxes the requirement by frequently re-calibrating a simple
environment model based on the current state and the extrapo-
lated near-future state. SAFECHAIN then re-checks (e.g., every
1s or when the current state changes) the automation rules
given the updated model.
Challenge 2: The state explosion problem in model check-
ing. The number of states in FSM grows exponentially with
attributes. Given hundreds of rules (and device attributes), how
can we accurately and efficiently detect vulnerable rules? In
addition, to support frequent rechecking as stated in the first
challenge, the verification should be able to run as close to
real-time as possible. SAFECHAIN employs two rule-aware
optimization techniques to reduce redundant checks and to run
significantly faster than using an off-the-shelf model checker.
Our comparative analysis shows that SAFECHAIN can ef-
ficiently and accurately identify attack chains. Our prototype
implementation of SAFECHAIN can efficiently verify up to 300
automation rules within one second, outperforming the base-
line without any optimization, which can take more than 15
minutes. The experimental results also show that SAFECHAIN
has no false positives under appropriate assumptions.
2A state is a value assignment of all device variables, rules are modeled as
state transitions, and exploitable devices are modeled as arbitrary change of
the variables of these devices at any time.
Contributions. This paper makes three contributions:
• We analyze the attack chains found in a real-world
dataset, investigate two attack classes (i.e., privilege es-
calation and privacy leakage), and formulate them as
checkable properties on FSMs.
• We design and implement SAFECHAIN, a lightweight
system to detect the two attack classes.
• We evaluate SAFECHAIN using a large-scale dataset and
compare with prior work. We show that SAFECHAIN can
verify 300 rules in less than 1s, which is up to 1,000 times
faster than the baseline approach, with no false negatives.
II. BACKGROUND
Before explaining how to identify vulnerable trigger-action
rules using model checking, we introduce the related back-
ground knowledge and terminologies.
A. Trigger-Action Rules and IFTTT
Networking capabilities allow IoT devices to communicate
and share information with each other. For example, an
occupancy sensor can control the lighting or heating system
in a smart home when it detects motion in the space, making
daily life more convenient and reducing unnecessary power
consumption. To support such custom automation, users can
utilize trigger-action programming to specify triggering cir-
cumstances to execute actions. The general format of a trigger-
action rule is as follows:
IF trigger, THEN action.
For example, the trigger of the previous instance is when
the occupancy sensor detects something and the action is to
turn on the light or activate the air conditioner. Thanks to its
simplicity and straightforwardness, novice users can use such
programming to customize their IoT device behavior [43].
These rules can also be machine generated [20], [35] or
learned [38], [43] from user intent.
IFTTT [10] is one of the leading services and platforms to
help users define custom automation on their IoT devices. With
more than one million registered users, IFTTT has connected
more than 400 devices and online services, and in 2015,
more than 19 million rules have been created and 600 mil-
lion rules have been executed monthly [18]. Other platforms
providing similar services include Samsung SmartThings [17],
Zapier [19] and Microsoft Flow [11].
B. Model Checking
Model checking is a method to formally verify finite-state
systems. A model (i.e., an abstract representation) of a system
is automatically and exhaustively checked to determine if it
complies with specified properties. The desired property of a
system is usually expressed in logic languages, such as Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL).
The characteristics of exhaustive checking from model
checking is especially suitable for security validation, because
every hidden threat can be found with no false alarm. Several
off-the-shelf model-checking tools are provided to help verify
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TABLE I: Examples of chained recipes
Chain Recipe 1 Recipe 2 Type
C1 Convert an e-mail to event in
Google Calendar
Send recurring Square Cash
payments with Google Calendar
& Gmail
privilege
C2 Disconnect from home Wi-Fi,
start recording on Manything
When Manything detects mo-
tion, scare the intruder.
privilege
C3 Turn off sprinklers when I arrive
home
If irrigation stopped, then blink
lights
privacy
C4 When your nest thermostat is
set to away then put your water
heater in vacation mode
If water heater enters vacation
mode, then turn off the lights
privacy
systems, such as NuSMV. Once the users model their systems
as finite state machines and express properties in supported
logic languages, the model checker can help determine if there
are any violations.
III. CASE STUDY
Before formally defining the problem, we show it is possible
to launch an attack using several harmless automation rules
and describe a home scenario as a working example.
A. Chained Recipes
Table I shows interesting examples of chained recipes we
found that can lead to attacks. The recipes are all chosen from
the public information on the IFTTT website in April, 2018.3
For simplicity, we only consider chains of length two.
The first two examples show privilege escalation attacks.
C1 exhibits how untrusted inputs flow through recipes to a
trusted action. The first recipe of C1 enables almost anyone
to create calendar events by sending mails to the owner, and
the second recipe of C1 creates recurring payments if an event
added to Google Calendar matches a given format. Therefore,
an attacker can receive payments from the victim by simply
sending a crafted email. C2 shows another example in which
the recipes are chained implicitly. The first recipe of C2 will
turn on the security camera (i.e., Manything) when the user
leaves home, while the second recipe of C2 will turn on lights,
sounds or speakers in order to scare an intruder. This implies
that even if the user is home and the camera is turned off,
an attacker can jam the Wi-Fi to control the house’s lighting,
sound, or speaker system. We consider them as chained recipes
since the second trigger fires only after the camera is turned
on. Though the attack might not cause any real damage, it can
still be annoying.
The last two examples illustrate privacy leakage attacks, and
we assume that knowing whether one is home is sensitive, and
that lightbulbs can be easily observed or compromised [40].
With C3, an attacker can learn that the owner returns home if
the observable light blinks. Similarly, in C4, the light indicates
whether the water heater is in vacation mode, and the water
heater’s mode is determined by a nest thermostat. Thus, the
thermostat mode (away or home) is leaked by the light in C4.
B. A Working Example
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified smart home scenario consist-
ing of ten devices and 12 rules. Smart home in reality can be
3Because there is no indication whether a rule is actively used by a user,
we assume a user may sign up for any subset of rules.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# Device Attribute Possiblestatuses
1 Light bulb light2 ON, OFF
2 Air ac ON, OFFconditioner
3 Thermometer temperature 0,1,...,100
4 Fan fan ON, OFF
5 Smart TV tv ON, OFF
6 Occupancy occupancy TRUEsensor FALSE
7 Surveillance camera ON, OFFcamera
8 Smart lock lock LOCKEDUNLOCKED
9 Light bulb light1 ON, OFF
10 Smart car location 0,1,...,127
Fig. 1: A Smart Home Scenario
even more complex (and thus harder to analyze), as the number
of connected IoT devices per household are anticipated to rise
to 50 by 2020 [8], and a real dataset provided by a smart home
owner (see Appendix B for details) contains 85 IoT devices
connected through nearly 70 automation rules. The table at the
bottom of Figure 1 summarizes the devices and their possible
statuses, and Table II lists the automation rules used in this
example. Note that rules may be created by multiple users
to accommodate individual needs. A small user study (see
Appendix C for details) showed that a household of three will
have a high chance to adopt all rules used in this example.
These rules are specified in the format of trigger-action
programming and can work in an automation service like
IFTTT. In this example, the homeowner’s intention is to record
people entering or leaving the house. Thus, the surveillance
camera will be turned on before the door is unlocked (R1-R2)
and off after the door is locked (R3-R5). The rules from R6
to R12 are designed for energy efficiency, so the appliances
in the living room will be switched on and off with respect to
different conditions of weather and human presence.
Unfortunately, not every IoT device is equally secure; some
might have vulnerabilities that have not been patched. By
compromising a vulnerable device, an attacker may be able
to control or observe other devices due to inter-device depen-
dencies. In the example in Table II, suppose the GPS sensor
in the smart car [6] and the lightbulb [12] are compromised,
and their states are controlled by an attacker. The attacker can
infer whether the owner is home (i.e., by knowing the status of
the occupancy sensor), and stealthily break in the house (i.e.,
by unlocking the smart lock while the surveillance camera is
off) by leveraging one or a chain of automation rules as we
will explain in §IV-A.
From the above examples, most of the recipes may look
seemingly harmless if observed individually, but can become
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TABLE II: Example Rules
Rule Trigger Action
R1 User is near home
Turn on the outside lightbulb
Turn on the surveillance camera
location = 0 light1← ON, camera← ON
R2 The surveillance camera is turned on Unlock the smart lock
camera = ON lock← UNLOCKED
R3 User has been driven out Lock the smart lock
location 6= 0 lock← LOCKED
R4 The smart lock is locked Turn off the outside lightbulb
lock = LOCKED light1← OFF
R5 The outside lightbulb is off Turn off the surveillance camera
light1 = OFF camera← OFF
R6 Occupancy sensor detects someone Switch on the smart TV
occupancy = TRUE tv← ON
R7 Occupancy sensor detects nobody Switch off the smart TV
occupancy = FALSE tv← OFF
R8 The smart TV is on Turn on the inside lightbulb
tv = ON light2← ON
R9 The smart TV is off Turn off the inside lightbulb
tv = OFF light2← OFF
R10 Temperature is a little high Turn on the fan
temperature ≥ 28 fan← ON
R11 Temperature is high Turn on the air conditioner
temperature ≥ 32 ac← ON
R12 Temperature is low
Turn off the fan
Turn off the air conditioner
temperature ≤ 25 fan← OFF, ac← OFF
harmful when chained together. As the number of devices and
recipes are likely to increase in the near future, it is harder for
humans to debug unsafe chains, especially when recipes are
created at different times or by different people.
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The goal of this work is to create an automated system that
can efficiently detect trigger-action attack chains and suggest
fixes to users. Here, we define an attack chain as a set of rules
such that the action of one rule in the set satisfies the trigger
condition of another rule in the set.
Consider a smart space4 consisting of IoT devices, user-
defined trigger-action rules, and a service provider. These
devices can interact with each other explicitly through automa-
tion rules. Such automation is implemented using a trusted
service provider that executes rules whose trigger conditions
are satisfied by the current device state.
In the rest of this section, we define the threat model, system
model, and desired properties in detail.
A. Threat Model
We consider a realistic attacker who has compromised a set
of vulnerable devices at the beginning; for example, via ma-
licious apps, known exploits, or proximity-based attacks [46].
The attacker can read and write attributes of the compromised
devices at any time. Because we are developing a defense
system, we consider a strong adversary that knows all the rules
created by users5. By successfully mitigating such a strong
adversary, we can also mitigate weaker adversaries who know
partial information, as discussed in §VII. The attacker’s goal
4Such a smart space can be a home, building, office, factory, etc. For ease
of demonstration, we will use smart homes (as illustrated in §III-B) in our
examples throughout the paper.
5Many IFTTT users publish their rules online, and most service providers
(e.g., IFTTT, Zapier, or Samsung SmartThings) provide a public dataset of
automation rules so that users can quickly create customized automation.
is to exploit IoT automation and perform unauthorized actions
(privilege escalation) or unauthorized reads (privacy leakage).
Privilege escalation. In a privilege escalation attack, the
attacker attempts to make the IoT system transition into an
insecure state (e.g., the door is unlocked when cameras are
off), which can never be reached if the devices are operating
as expected. To do this, the attacker actively manipulates
the attributes of the compromised devices, thereby triggering
changes of other devices via automation rules. Sometimes the
attacker may also need to manipulate the device attributes in
a specific sequence and at a specific time.
In the example in §III-B, the attacker can manipulate the
state of the smart lock and surveillance camera, thus break in
stealthily without being recorded, even with no direct control
of the two devices. To achieve this, the adversary forces the
GPS sensor to incorrectly report (e.g., by generating a stronger,
fake GPS signal or hacking the backend service [14]) that the
car is home. The service provider is then misled to apply rules
R1 and R2 to turn on the outside lightbulb and surveillance
camera and unlock the smart lock, respectively. After that, the
adversary forges the status of the lightbulb to trigger rule R5,
which turns off the surveillance camera.
Privacy leakage. In a privacy leakage attack, the attacker at-
tempts to deduce private information from publicly observable
data and the attributes of compromised devices. In addition to
passive observation, the attacker can also actively manipulate
compromised devices and observe the resulting changes.
In the example in §III-B, the attacker can infer whether
the owner is home by monitoring the state of the vulnerable
lightbulb inside. This is because when the occupancy sensor
detects a human presence, rules R6 and R8 will be triggered,
thus turning on the smart TV and the inside lightbulb. On the
other hand, if the occupancy sensor detects no one, rules R7
and R9 will be applied, and both the smart TV and inside
lightbulb will both be off. Thus, the adversary can infer the
state of the occupancy sensor through monitoring the state of
the inside lightbulb.
B. System Model
Devices. A device’s state can be represented using a set of
attributes, which can be accessed via APIs. For example, a
thermometer can have a temperature attribute, which is set
to the value perceived by its temperature sensor; a lightbulb
or surveillance camera can have a switch attribute that
represents whether its functionality is enabled or disabled.
Note that these attributes may be affected by the time-
varying environment via the devices’ sensors. They may also
affect the environment via the devices’ actuators.
Trigger-action rules. Users can enable automation between
devices by adding customized trigger-action rules. Users need
to specify a trigger and the corresponding action when creating
a customized rule.
A service provider. We consider IoT automation implemented
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using a trusted service provider6 (e.g., IFTTT, Zapier, or
Samsung SmartThings). The service provider offers an inter-
face for users to add or remove customized rules and can
interact with devices through their APIs. We assume that the
service provider polls devices periodically; that is, queries
every device’s status to check for satisfying rules and to
apply corresponding actions. We also assume that the service
provider can resolve conflicting rules and avoid ambiguities,
e.g., by enforcing an order of precedence on rules [34], [39].
C. Desired Properties
Low false rates. The system should accurately identify priv-
ilege escalation and privacy leakage attacks. A false positive
occurs when the system falsely reports an attack, which may
annoy users or affect normal functionality of IoT devices. A
false negative occurs when the system fails to identify an
attack, providing users with a false sense of security.
Timely detection. The system should be able to scale to
hundreds or even thousands of devices and rules, and detect
potential attacks in a timely manner. Timely detection ensures
that users have sufficient time to fix problematic rules before
they are exploited. Designing a scalable algorithm is challeng-
ing because the number of possible state combinations grows
exponentially with devices and rules.
Low interference with intended functionalities. One way
to prevent attackers from exploiting automation rules is to ask
users for permission before executing every rule. However, this
simple fix contradicts the purpose of IoT automation, which
is to make users’ lives easier. Hence, the mitigation method
should avoid interfering with users’ intended functionalities
and should not place a burden on users.
V. SAFECHAIN
The core idea of SAFECHAIN is to model the IoT ecosystem
as a Finite State Machine (FSM), such that finding an attack
can be reduced to a property-checking problem on the FSM,
which can be solved using existing model checkers. To im-
prove its practicability, SAFECHAIN deploys novel techniques
to overcome the research challenges described in §I.
After highlighting the core insights and the system overview
(§V-A), we explain how SAFECHAIN models the problem
of identifying automation rule exploitation as a reachability
problem on a finite state machine (§V-B), such that we can
adopt model-checking techniques to ensure accurate detection
of privilege escalation and privacy leakage (§V-C). As model
checking tends to be a slow process, we propose several
rule-aware optimization techniques to achieve timely detection
(§V-D). Finally, we explore how to mitigate the identified
attacks with low interference (§V-E).
6Securing the service provider is an orthogonal problem to our work, but
we emphasize that the service provider has incentives and resources to employ
better security measures than individual IoT devices. Many IoT vendors focus
on providing novel functionalities rather than security, and IoT devices rarely
adopt strong security measures due to limited resources. On the other hand,
once the service provider is compromised, the attacker can directly control
all devices to launch powerful attacks, which will ruin the service provider’s
reputation.
A. High-Level System Overview
As shown in Figure 2, SAFECHAIN takes in rules, devices,
vulnerability databases, and security policies, and reports
identified attacks to users. Users can interact with SAFECHAIN
using an application interface to check detailed attack traces
and apply fixes.
We envision that SAFECHAIN can work as an extension to
an existing IoT automation service provider or as a standalone
system, and the inputs can be supplied by the service provider,
IoT vendors, crowdsourcing sites, users, etc. Experts can help
provide default security policies, and users can revise them
according to their needs.
Because the adversary’s goal is to control an uncompro-
mised device or leak data from an uncompromised device
via automation rules, it is reasonable to consider cases where
some devices are vulnerable and some are not. (The attacker
succeeds immediately if all devices are compromised.) Several
approaches exist to determine the vulnerable devices. For
example, vulnerability databases provide lists of vulnerable
devices7. Alternatively, users can manually select devices that
require high level of protection, in which case our system
assumes that all the other devices are vulnerable and evaluates
whether the manually-selected devices are attackable.
SAFECHAIN consists of four major components:
1) Modeling. To model the interaction between devices and
rules, we build a FSM in which the device statuses and
automation rules correspond to the states and transitions,
respectively. In addition, to model a volatile environment
(Challenge 1), we use a short-lived window to predict the
changes of each sensor variable and renew the prediction
after the previous one expires.
2) Verification. To verify the system, it is crucial to define
the attacker model in the FSM. The verification compo-
nent translates the given security policies into the FSM
properties, which can be checked using a model checker.
Once the short-lived windows are due, our system re-
verifies the model again with the new windows.
3) Optimization. To scale to a large number of devices
and rules (Challenge 2), we propose two rule-aware
optimization techniques to shrink the size of the FSM by
pruning redundant states and grouping equivalent states.
Since the optimization is done before transforming into
FSM, with high-level semantics preserved, our approach
incurs less overhead compared to general optimization
techniques implemented in common model checkers.
4) Mitigation. The mitigation component greedily selects a
small set of rules whose removal can disable the identi-
fied attacks. To avoid violating intended functionalities,
this component also shows the identified attack traces
and suggests fixes to the users.
As shown in §VI, SAFECHAIN can verify hundreds of rules
in just a few seconds, and thus is capable of frequent rechecks
based on the latest rule set and sensor-attribute values. Note
7Several public datasets have been established to consider the consumer
device vulnerabilities. For instance, National Vulnerability Database [13] and
AndroidVulnerabilities [1] have accumulated a variety of vulnerabilities with
respect to different devices and smart phones.
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Devices
Rules
Vulnerability
Databases 3 4
5
Rule1
Rule2
Rule3 Rule4
1. Modeling
Attack
Security Policies
• Privilege escalation
• Privacy leakage
3 4 5
2.Verification
Device1 Device2
Device3 Device4
Device5
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3. Optimizations
4. Mitigation
System Overview
Accompany App
Execute Rule?
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Execution of rules 
may cause someth-
ing dangerous:
...
...
...
3
Rule3
4 5
Attack Rule4
Fig. 2: System overview. “S” stands for states.
that frequent rechecks are needed to accommodate the short-
lived window for the modeling environment.
B. Modeling
We will first describe how we encode each concept sepa-
rately, and then explain in detail how SAFECHAIN models the
whole smart space to simulate the possible interactions. The
same modeling is used for detecting both privilege escalation
and privacy leak.
Devices. Each device is symbolized by using a set of attributes
to represent its equipped sensors, actuators or internal states.
We use A to denote this attribute set of all devices, which are
classified into two disjoint groups: read-only attributes AR and
read-write attributes ARW . The former corresponds to sensors,
which provide APIs only for obtaining values, and the latter
corresponds to actuators, which provide APIs for obtaining
and setting values. Possible values of each attribute ai ∈ A
are specified in its API specifications and we use possible(ai)
to denote this set.
Automation rules. A rule, represented by ri ≡
(booli, assigni), can be specified by users or generated
by machines. booli is a Boolean-valued function defined over
the device attribute space, and ri is triggered when booli is
evaluated to be TRUE. assigni defines the action of the rule.
This function maps device attributes to values.
For simplicity, we assume that all the satisfied rules (i.e.,
booli(s) = TRUE) are executed concurrently. We also assume
that if there is a conflict between rules, some resolution
techniques are applied, such as user preferences, to ensure
that the service provider knows which rules to execute. Two
rules ri and rj are said to be conflicting if they assign different
values to the same variable (i.e., assigni(ak) 6= assignj(ak)).
Environment. The values of sensor attributes will change as
the environment changes and corresponding sensors perceive
the differences. At one extreme, we could try to model
the environment accurately using knowledge and formula in
physics. However, since the smart space can be a home, office
or factory, they may differ greatly in their environments. It is
hard to use one or few formulas to cover all conditions. At
the other extreme, we could set every sensor attribute to be
constraint-free and check every combination of their values at
any time, but this may cause excessive false alarms because
some combinations may never happen in the real world.
To strike a middle ground between the two extremes, we
propose a practical approach to handle environmental changes
in SAFECHAIN by focusing on possible changes in the near
future. Specifically, for each sensor attribute ai ∈ AR of a
secure device, we try to predict a window window(ai) ⊆
possible(ai) in which this attribute will reside during a period
of time, and after the period has elapsed, we repeat the
prediction process and verify the rules again. For example,
the temperature is expected to be between 23 and 33 Celsius
degrees tomorrow, based on the weather forecast. To ensure
that no attacks will occur tomorrow, there is no need to check
values outside this window (unless the thermometer is assumed
to be hacked). A similar assumption can be made for the GPS
sensor in a smart car, because the car movement obeys the
laws of physics and cannot move faster than a certain speed.
For sensors without known constraints on their attribute values
(e.g., an occupancy sensor), we enumerate all possible
conditions in the future, i.e. window(ai) = possible(ai).
In addition, to alleviate the impact of inaccurate prediction,
SAFECHAIN will monitor the sensing data and immediately
recheck and re-predict if the prediction is violated. In our
implementation, the prediction window is derived from a fixed
width for each sensor attribute and can be adjusted with respect
to users’ tolerance to false alarms. It can also be improved by
using techniques such as machine learning.
Adversary. Given the vulnerability databases, SAFECHAIN
uses AV UL ⊆ A to denote the attribute set of vulnerable
devices. Any attribute in AV UL can be monitored or modified
by an attacker at any time.
An attacker can be either active or passive. A passive
attacker gathers information about compromised devices over
time and tries to infer information about secure devices,
while an active attacker reports bogus information to trigger
automation rules. We use a special attribute attack, which
can be either ACTIVE or PASSIVE at a time, to represent
the chosen strategy.
The whole smart space is then modeled as a finite state
machine, which is a tuple FSM ≡ (S,−→, I) where S is a
set of states, −→⊆ S × S is a transition relation, and I ⊆ S
is a set of initial states.
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A state s ∈ S is an N -tuple (a1, a2, . . . aN ), where ai ∈ A
are the attributes of all installed devices. We use the notation
s(ai) to represent the value of ai in s. Set S consists of all the
possible states in the smart space while set I contains only one
state representing the current status. The next possible state s′
from state s can be affected by automation rules, environment,
and the adversary simultaneously. Formally for state s, the
transition relation (s, s′) ∈−→ exists if for any ai ∈ A,
s′(ai)
 ∈ possible(ai) if ai ∈ AV UL and s
′(attack) = ACTIVE
∈ window(ai) if ai ∈ AR
= assignk(ai) if boolk(s) = TRUE for some rule rk
= s(ai) otherwise.
 .
The first condition corresponds to the case when the attacker
actively controls the devices so that the vulnerable attributes
can be set to any possible value. The second condition limits
the environment attributes to remain in our predicted values,
and the third defines the effects of automation rules. In
addition to what is discussed, the status of devices will remain
unchanged.
C. Verification
In this subsection, we explain the formats of security
policies for privilege escalation and privacy leakage, and how
such policies are translated into FSM’s properties that can
be verified using model checking tools. We envision that (1)
our system has a set of pre-installed general security policies
written by experts, and (2) users can modify or create their own
policies, and share their policies to a public dataset. Even if
sophisticated users can write their own security policies, it may
still be challenging for them to manually check all possible
interactions between devices.
Privilege escalation. A security policy defines the expected
behaviors of devices, and can be represented by conditions
that either must be or must not be satisfied. They are stated in
the form of “device1 is (not) state1 and/or device2 is (not)
state2 and/or ...”. To improve usability, users only need to
select the values of devicei, statei and the logical connective
(and, or, not); SAFECHAIN will then convert it into LTL or
CTL. For example, AG(lock = LOCKED ∨ camera =
ON) = AG¬(lock = UNLOCKED ∧ camera = OFF)
in CTL expresses that the policy “smart lock is unlocked but
surveillance camera is off” should not happen.
Privacy leakage. The privacy policy defines the level of
privacy for each device, which can be expressed by assigning
a label (PRIVATE, PUBLIC, or OTHER) to each attribute.
A device attribute labeled as PRIVATE indicates that the
attribute contains confidential information and should be pro-
tected from an attacker’s observation, while the PUBLIC label
indicates that an attacker may end up observing the attribute
through hacking or some local observations (e.g., lights can be
observed from outside at night). We propose the OTHER label
for those attributes that are neither confidential (PRIVATE)
nor vulnerable (PUBLIC) from the user’s perspectives (i.e.,
user does not care about the information leakage). Although
the OTHER class complicates the analysis process and cannot
be handled by prior methods [25], [27], [42], it allows us to
accurately model real-world settings.
occupancy: FALSE
camera: OFF
lock: LOCKED
tv: OFF
fan: OFF
ac: OFF
temperature: 25
light1: OFF
light2: OFF
location: 1
occupancy: FALSE
camera: OFF
lock: LOCKED
tv: OFF
fan: OFF
ac: OFF
temperature: 25
light1: OFF
light2: OFF
location: 1
occupancy: FALSE
camera: OFF
lock: LOCKED
tv: OFF
fan: OFF
ac: OFF
temperature: 25
light1: OFF
light2: OFF
location: 1
occupancy: TRUE
camera: OFF
lock: LOCKED
tv: OFF
fan: OFF
ac: OFF
temperature: 25
light1: OFF
light2: OFF
location: 1
occupancy: TRUE
camera: OFF
lock: LOCKED
tv: ON
fan: OFF
ac: OFF
temperature: 25
light1: OFF
light2: OFF
location: 1
occupancy: TRUE
camera: OFF
lock: LOCKED
tv: ON
fan: OFF
ac: OFF
temperature: 25
light1: OFF
light2: ON
location: 1
T
T + 1
T + 2
R6
R8
Fig. 3: Example of privacy leakage. Different PRIVATE values
(green) lead to different PUBLIC values (red) after some
transitions.
occupancy: FALSE
temperature: 25
occupancy: TRUE
temperature: 25
(a) Original FSM
occupancy’: FALSE
temperature’: 25
occupancy’: TRUE
temperature’: 25
(b) Cloned FSM
occupancy: FALSE
temperature: 25
occupancy’: FALSE
temperature’: 25
occupancy: FALSE
temperature: 25
occupancy’: TRUE
temperature’: 25
occupancy: TRUE
temperature: 25
occupancy’: FALSE
temperature’: 25
occupancy: TRUE
temperature: 25
occupancy’: TRUE
temperature’: 25
(c) Product FSM
Fig. 4: Example of a product machine. The initial states are
shaded. On the product FSM, two parallel traces of the original
FSM can be viewed as a single trace, which makes our privacy
policy expressible in LTL/CTL.
In the motivating example, the attribute occupancy,
which indicates whether someone is home, is considered
private. However, as shown in Figure 3, attackers can infer
the actual value of this PRIVATE attribute (colored in green)
at time T by observing the PUBLIC attributes (colored in
red) at time T + 2, because different values of the PRIVATE
attribute trigger different automation rules and eventually lead
to different values of the PUBLIC attributes. That is, if the
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value of light2 is ON, the value of occupancy should be
TRUE. Otherwise, it should be FALSE.
Inspired by this observation, we want to ensure that any two
states that are only different in PRIVATE attributes in the same
environmental changes should stay indistinguishable from the
adversary’s perspective at any future time. That is, the values
of the PUBLIC attributes should stay the same between these
two traces at any moment. If not, the adversary can tell the
two traces apart and infer the values of PRIVATE attributes.
The environmental changes should be equivalent in both traces
because attackers can only observe the change in real life.
Formally, SAFECHAIN defines security against privacy leak-
age as follows:
∀s0, s′0 ∈ S, t > 0{
s0 =PUBLIC,OTHER s
′
0
st(ai) = s
′
t(ai) ∀ai ∈ AR
=⇒ st =PUBLIC s′t,
where =PUBLIC and =PUBLIC,OTHER stand for the equiva-
lence over PUBLIC only and PUBLIC and OTHER attributes,
respectively.
Hence, to check whether a PRIVATE attribute can be leaked,
we can modify the PRIVATE attribute and see if the trace
is altered from the attacker’s perspective. Nonetheless, these
kinds of properties cannot be expressed in ordinary LTL or
CTL because it requires pairwise comparison between two
traces of the finite state machine.
To overcome this challenge, we construct a product machine
as follows. We first build an almost equivalent copy of the
original FSM, and their differences reside in the PRIVATE
values of the initial states. For example, suppose the orig-
inal FSM is Figure 4a, then the copy one named CLONE
would be Figure 4b. (Shaded states are the initial states.)
Formally, CLONE ≡ (S,−→, I ′), and I ′ = {s′|s′ =L,O
s,∀s′ ∈ S, s ∈ I}. Then, the states of product machine
PM are Cartesian products of the states of the two state
machines, as in Figure 4c. The initial state is the state that
consists of the initial states of original and cloned FSM. The
transitions can be seen as the union of the transitions from
both machines. That is, PM ≡ (S × S,−→′, I × I ′), where
−→′= {((si, sj), (s′i, s′j))|(si, sj) ∈−→ ∧(s′i, s′j) ∈−→}.
We also add constraints to ensure that the original and
cloned machines undergo the same environmental changes.
To this end, the problem is reduced to whether the product
machine can arrive at a state where its two internal states
are different in the PUBLIC attributes, which is a reachability
problem and can be expressed in ordinary LTL or CTL. Al-
though building a product machine increases the state space8,
our evaluation shows that the verification can still be efficiently
performed with our optimization techniques.
Our product FSM construction is similar to the self-
composition approach proposed by Gilles et al. [27]. How-
ever, it is unclear whether their program-execution-based non-
interference definition can model the event-driven scenar-
ios in trigger-action programming. In addition, SAFECHAIN
8If the original state machine is O(2N ), then the product machine will
become O(2N ) ∗O(2N ) = O(4N ), where N is the number of attributes.
TABLE III: Grouping of variables. Given a set of rules, values
of variables are grouped together if they trigger same actions,
reducing the number of states to be considered in FSM.
Attributes Possible values Constraints Grouped values
light1 ON, OFF light1 = OFF ON, OFF
light1← OFF
camera ON, OFF camera = ON ON, OFF
location 0, ..., 10* location = 0 0,OTHERSlocation 6= 0
lock
LOCKED
lock = LOCKED LOCKEDUNLOCKED UNLOCKED
occupancy TRUE, FALSE occupancy = TRUE TRUE, FALSE
occupancy = FALSE
tv ON, OFF tv = ON ON, OFF
tv = OFF
light2 ON, OFF light2← ON ON, OFF
light2← OFF
fan ON, OFF ALL
ac ON, OFF ALL
temperature 23, ..., 33*
temperature ≥ 28 26..27,28..31
temperature ≥ 32 32..33
temperature ≤ 25 23..25
* Short-lived windows for location and temperature are [0, 10] and [23, 33]
respectively.
avoids the additional cost of transforming a program to a
state machine because the security properties of trigger-action
programming can be directly defined over a transition system
instead of a program.
D. Optimization
To enable timely verification, SAFECHAIN’s optimization
component aims to simplify the input (a model of a smart
space) by removing redundant attribute values, rules, and
devices. As the input to the model checker is reduced, the
verification process can be accelerated. We explain in detail
how SAFECHAIN reduces the size of the problem by grouping
attribute values that always cause the same effects, and by
pruning devices and rules irrelevant to the security policy.
Generally speaking, our practice shares the same spirit with
common techniques to address state explosion (e.g. group-
ing equivalences). However, thanks to the simple structure
of trigger-action programs, we can effectively address the
state explosion problem in model checking using static code
analysis. We first obtain high-level program semantics using
static analysis, and then efficiently construct an abstraction of
the state-transition system without spurious counterexamples;
thus, no further refinement is needed [23]. In addition, as
our application scenarios consider non-technical users who
specify their own rules and security policies, we further
consider optimizations for simple security polices (in contrast
to complex ones with temporal qualifiers).
Grouping. In trigger-action programming, two attribute values
can be considered equivalent if they always trigger the same
actions, regardless of the other attributes. Hence, we can
reduce the number of states needed to be considered by
grouping equivalent values into subgroups (or meta-values)
and then rewrite the automation rules using the new meta-
values. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code. First, we collect
all constraints from the rules (Lines 2-9) and the policy (Lines
10-13). Then, the acquired constraints are sorted for each
attribute, which is used to classify possible values into meta-
values (Lines 14-18). Here, we build a map to convert between
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TABLE IV: Rule rewriting. Rules in Table II are rewritten
w.r.t. the grouped values in Table III.
Rule Trigger Action
R10
Temperature is a little high Turn on the fan
temperature = 28..31
fan← ALL∨temperature = 32..33
R11 Temperature is high Turn on the air conditioner
temperature = 32..33 ac← ALL
R12 Temperature is low
Turn off the fan
Turn off the air conditioner
temperature = 23..25 fan← ALL, ac← ALL
Algorithm 1: Grouping
Data:
A is a list of attributes
R is a list of rules
P is the policy to be verified
Result: AGrouped, RGrouped
1 begin
2 constraints = Dictionary(List);
3 for ri ∈ R do
4 trigger ← GetTrigger(ri);
5 for constraint ∈ trigger do
6 ai ← GetTarget(constraint);
7 constraints[ai].append(constraint);
8 end for
9 end for
10 for constraint ∈ P do
11 ai ← GetTarget(constraint);
12 constraints[ai].append(constraint);
13 end for
14 for ai ∈ A do
15 values← Sorted(constraints[ai]);
16 aGroupedi ← GroupAttribute(ai, values);
17 AGrouped.append(aGroupedi );
18 end for
19 for ri ∈ R do
20 booli ← GetEqualTrigger(AGrouped, ri);
21 assigni ← GetEqualAction(AGrouped, ri);
22 rGroupedi ←MakeRule(booli, assigni);
23 RGrouped.append(rGroupedi );
24 end for
25 end
meta-values and original values. Finally, we translate rules to
equivalencies by looking up the map (Lines 19-24). Overall,
sorting the acquired constraints for each attribute takes most of
the time, and the number of possible constraints is proportional
to the number of rules. For a single attribute, the maximum
number of constraints is O(kM), where k is the maximum
number of constraints in a rule and M is the number of rules.
Hence, the time complexity is O(kMN log kM), where N is
the number of attributes.
Table III and Table IV show the meta-values and rewritten
rules after the grouping method is applied to the example in
§III-B, respectively. The temperature values ≤ 25 are consid-
ered equivalent because they all trigger rule R12. The possible
values of the attribute temperature are divided into four
subgroups, thereby the number of states is reduced to four.
In rule R10, the trigger temperature ≥ 28 is converted
to temperature = 28..31 ∨ temperature = 32..33 and
action fan ← ON is the same as fan ← ALL because its
value does not affect the execution of any rules.
Note that constraints in policies should also be taken into
consideration as they will also affect the grouping results.
Pruning. While grouping reduces the number of possible
values of an attribute, pruning aims to reduce the number of
attributes needed to be considered because not every device
can influence the state of another device. For instance, to
check this CTL specification AG¬(lock = UNLOCKED ∧
camera = OFF) in the example in §III-B, we only need
to consider devices in the front door because all the devices
inside the house have no impact (via the automation rule) on
the smart lock and the surveillance camera.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code for pruning. To prune
irrelevant devices, we represent the relationship between de-
vices by building a dependency graph (Lines 2-14), in which
each vertex represents an attribute, and a directed edge from
one vertex to another represents one attribute being able
to affect the other. After building a dependency graph, we
back-trace from interesting attributes (that are involved in
the security policy) to find relevant devices (Lines 15-26).
Building the dependency graph takes most of the time and
requires adding edges between trigger attributes and action
attributes. The worst-case scenario is that both the trigger
and action contain all attributes for each rule. Thus, the time
complexity is O(MN2), where M and N are the number of
rules and attributes, respectively.
Figure 5 illustrates the dependency graph of the exam-
ple in §III-B. For each rule, we check the dependency be-
tween the involved devices. For example, in rule R1, the
attributes light1 and camera are affected by the attribute
location. Thus, on the dependency graph, we add two
directed edges from location to light1 and camera
respectively, and label these two edges with rule R1 to track
their relationship. During backtracking, we start from the
interesting attributes (e.g., lock and camera in the policy
AG¬(lock = UNLOCKED ∧ camera = OFF)) and find
all connected vertices (i.e., relevant attributes) and connected
edges (i.e., relevant rules).
In privacy leakage, the vulnerable devices observable by
attackers are interesting attributes, such as light1, light2
and location in the example in §III-B. We further accelerate
the verification of privacy leakage by filtering out PUBLIC
attributes that are unreachable from any PRIVATE attribute
on the dependency graph, because there is no leak if the
PRIVATE attributes have no impact on the PUBLIC attributes.
If any PUBLIC attribute can be reached, we back-trace from
those reachable PUBLIC vertices. Hence, we can perform the
verification with only three attributes after back-tracing from
light2 in the example in §III-B.
E. Mitigation
Ideally, if one could fix every vulnerable device imme-
diately, the attacker would be unable to increase the attack
surface by exploiting automation rules. However, patching in a
timely manner is challenging, and devices may also have zero-
day vulnerabilities. Hence, in this work, we discuss mitigations
that can be achieved by updating automation rules, which
include removing or modifying exploitable ones with users’
consent. The question then becomes which to remove or how
to modify them.
A straightforward approach is to put every rule involved in
the identified attacks into a watchlist, and request confirmation
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Fig. 5: Dependency graph for privilege escalation. The ver-
tices represent attributes and the edges represent rules. Only
attributes which involved in the security policy (in black) and
their dependencies (in grey) need to be considered in the
verification process.
Algorithm 2: Pruning
Data:
A is a list of attributes
R is a list of rules
P is the policy to be verified
Result: ARelated, RRelated
1 begin
2 graph← Graph();
3 for ai ∈ A do
4 graph.addNode(ai);
5 end for
6 for ri ∈ R do
7 bool attributes← GetTriggerAttributes(ri);
8 assign attributes← GetActionAttributes(ri);
9 for aj ∈ bool attributes do
10 for ak ∈ assign attributes do
11 graph.addEdge(aj , ak, ri);
12 end for
13 end for
14 end for
15 unexplored nodes← GetAssociatedAttributes(Policy);
16 while unexplored nodes 6= ∅ do
17 a← unexplored nodes.pop();
18 ARelated.add(a);
19 for neighbor ∈ graph.neighbors(a) do
20 if neighbor /∈ ARelated then
21 unexplored nodes.add(neighbor);
22 end if
23 r ← graph.getEdgeMark(a, neighbor);
24 RRelated.add(r);
25 end for
26 end while
27 end
from the user whenever a watchlisted rule is about to be exe-
cuted. Although this can indeed prevent attacks, it undermines
the convenience of this system.
To reduce the level of inconvenience, we would like to add
as few rules to the watchlist as possible. For each attack chain,
it is sufficient to stop the attack by blocking at least one rule
in the chain. Also, one rule can appear in multiple attack
chains. Therefore, one possible approach is to first determine
all the attack chains, then apply some optimization techniques
or greedy strategies to minimize the blocked rules.
Nonetheless, the question remains of how to effectively
figure out all the attack traces, because model-checking tools
like NuSMV report only one counterexample at a time. It is
also unclear what the selection algorithm would be like. We
will leave these problems for future research. On the other
hand, Salus [30] proposed a solution that first parameterizes
TABLE V: Comparison between SAFECHAIN and related
work. O: supported; X: not supported; 4: inaccurate; ♦: can
be extended.
Properties SAFECHAIN Milijanaet al. [42] SIFT [31] Salus [30]
Consider attacks O O X* X*
Detect privacy leakage O 4 X X
Detect privilege escalation O X ♦ ♦
Detect integrity attack ♦ 4 X X
Consider device states O X O O
Analysis technique Modelchecking
Information
flow
Symbolic
execution
Model
checking
Verification Speed Fast Very fast Slow Slow
* focuses on the reliability problem (i.e. policy validation or conflict detection) in trigger-
action programming.
trigger conditions, and then finds a feasible configuration using
model checking. However, such an approach also suffers from
usability problems, because Salus needs user permission to
accept or reject each set of feasible parameters one by one,
and there may be multiple sets of feasible parameters.
VI. EVALUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
We evaluate SAFECHAIN’s security and performance us-
ing analytical comparisons (§VI-A) and experiments (§VI-C-
VI-D) on a prototype implementation described in §VI-B.
A. Security comparison
We compare SAFECHAIN with closely related work [30],
[31], [42] and the results are summarized in Table V. The
integrity attack is the opposite of the privacy leakage attack;
devices with attributes labeled PRIVATE should not be af-
fected by vulnerable devices.
To identify potential integrity and privacy violations in
automation rules, Milijana et al. [42] define information flow
lattices and check if information can flow from a more
restricted trigger to a less restricted action. However, as their
work focuses on static analysis on automation rules and does
not consider the actual attribute values, their method cannot
detect whether the system will enter an unauthorized state
in the future (privilege escalation). Also, static analysis may
produce false positives when detecting privacy leakage, since
the actual values of devices are omitted.
As shown in Table VI, R3 will raise a false alarm because
the information is propagated from restricted to public, when
in reality, it will never be triggered since the volume will
always be higher than 0. Another example is R4. Whether
it will leak information depends on the parameters. If the
second condition is set to volume ≤ 100, the attacker cannot
derive information about the volume value by monitoring the
status of the LED. Hence, the location of this user will not be
disclosed. We label both actions as public, because information
can be leaked not only from publicly-observable devices but
from vulnerable devices, whose information can be directly
accessed by the attacker. For example, some smart bands have
been reported with vulnerabilities [24]. Once attackers break
into a device, its information is considered public.
SIFT [31] and Salus [30] are designed to help users debug
trigger-action rules by verifying whether the devices’ inter-
action (through automation rules) meets users’ expectations.
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TABLE VI: Rules for case study. R3 will raise a false alarm
in static analysis because the volume is always greater than or
equal to 50 at runtime and will never trigger R3.
Rule Trigger Action
R1 User is at home (private) Set the volume (restricted)
location = HOME volume← 50
R2 User is outside (private) Set the volume (restricted)
location 6= HOME volume← 100
R3 Any phone call missed with low volume (restricted) Set band to vibrate (public)
missed_call = TRUE ∧ volume ≤ 0 band_vibration← TRUE
R4 Any phone call missed with low volume (restricted) Blink the band LED (public)
missed_call = TRUE ∧ volume ≤ 50 band_led← BLINK
Since they focus on reliability rather than security, their tech-
niques cannot be directly applied to detect attacks exploiting
automation, but may be extended to check privilege escalation
to some extent. Using symbolic execution for automated
analysis, SIFT [31] starts by transforming automation rules
into IF statements in C#, and wrap all the rules in a while
loop. Each policy specified by the users is then encoded as an
assertion and will be checked by Pex, an automated whitebox
testing tool for .NET. However, they only unroll the while
loop for a fixed number of steps (k), and thus may have false
negatives for violations occurring after k steps. The subsequent
work, Salus [30], adopts model-checking techniques as we do.
However, it is unclear whether Salus can handle the growing
complexity in IoT, since their experiments show that the time
needed for verification increases exponentially after irrelevant
devices are installed. Thus, with respect to performance, Salus
can be seen as a baseline approach without optimizations.
On the contrary, SAFECHAIN is designed to detect privilege
escalation and privacy leakage. It can be easily extended
to detect integrity attacks by observing whether the values
of the PRIVATE attributes change when the values of the
PUBLIC attributes are altered. In addition, SAFECHAIN takes
advantage of formal model checking, which provides stronger
guarantees of reducing false negatives, and supports rule-aware
optimizations to accelerate verification.
B. Implementation
To demonstrate the practicality of our lightweight system,
we built a smart home testbed and an Android application as
shown in Figure 6. The major components, an IoT gateway
and SAFECHAIN, reside in a Raspberry Pi 2B board.
We implement an IoT gateway to provide similar function-
alities as existing service providers. Our system is built on
top of the Kura framework [3], a Java/OSGi-based platform
for building IoT gateways. We add several customized control
messages to enable communication between devices and pro-
tocols like MQTT and CoAP. To simulate a smart space, we
implement several IoT devices, such as fan, camera, tempera-
ture sensor and smart door using Arduino Yun, Raspberry Pi
and Banana Pi boards. After devices are connected to the IoT
gateway, they can share messages with each other.
Users can utilize our Android application to monitor, control
and manage these devices. Similar to existing home automa-
tion services, trigger-action rules can also be added using
Boolean function and assignments to enable automation. Our
system will query devices’ status regularly, apply satisfied
automation rules and update their status in the application.
To check which automation rules should be applied, we use
the Javaluator library [9], which is a powerful infix expression
evaluator for Java.
As discussed in §VI-C, the security policies shown in
Figure 6b can be set up by experts, modified by users, or
selected from a public database, and SAFECHAIN will convert
them into LTL or CTL for verification. The results are shown
in our application and alarms will be popped out to request
user confirmations when vulnerable automation rules are going
to be executed, as shown in Figures 6c and 6d.
User interaction model. We describe how users interact with
our system in a step-by-step manner. We assume a standalone
app that pulls information about devices and automation rules
from an existing automation platform (e.g., IFTTT). A similar
procedure can be described when our system is integrated with
an existing automation platform.
1) A user installs our app, which comes with default
security policies maintained by experts. The user can
also modify or write customized policies, as shown in
Fig. 6b.
2) Our app runs in the background and periodically re-
trieves the most recent set of automation rules from
the linked automation platform, and performs security
checks according the specified security policies.
3) When the app detects a violated security policy, a pop-up
warning is displayed, recommending the user to review
the rule set. When the user clicks the warning or opens
our app, the user can see detailed information about the
attack trace of the violation, as shown in Fig. 6c.
4) If the vulnerable rule is triggered before the user fixes
it, an alert will be displayed to request the user’s explicit
consent to execute the action, as shown in Fig. 6d.
This feature may require permissions to modify the data
stored in the automation platform, such as temporarily
disabling the action of the vulnerable rule.
C. Performance Evaluation
Based on the implementation, we conducted a large-scale
performance evaluation using a real dataset as described below.
In each run of the experiment, we randomly sampled N out of
the 4,161 rules we encoded and generate security polices with
respect to these sampled rules to simulate different scenarios.
SAFECHAIN can work with most model checkers; to compare
with previous work [30], we use the open-sourced model
checker, NuSMV, as our backend tool.
Dataset. We selected 42 IoT-related channels from a real
dataset containing 313 channels and 295,155 IFTTT rules [44].
We manually modeled these selected channels and obtained
190 attributes and 4,161 rules. The selected channels are listed
in Appendix A and the encoded data are available online [15].
The total state space is roughly 2650.
Privilege escalation. SAFECHAIN transforms security con-
cerns into LTL or CTL to check if the automation rules will be
exploited. To test the worst-case performance of SAFECHAIN,
we randomly build an always-TRUE specification, such that
every reachable state should be visited for verification: G(ai =
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Fig. 7: Performance evaluation for privilege escalation in LTL
v ∨ ai 6= v), where ai ∈ A and v ∈ possible(ai) are both
randomly chosen. We randomly select a vulnerable attribute
to simulate attacks, and each data point on the figure represents
the average of 200 experiment runs. We set a timeout of 30
minutes (1,800 seconds) for each run.
Figure 7a shows the verification time (in a logarithmic
scale) with and without our optimization techniques. Without
optimization, the verification time increases exponentially with
the number of rules. With optimization, SAFECHAIN can
verify 300 rules in < 1 second. Due to space limitations, we
omit similar results of using CTL specifications.
Figure 7b shows the processing time breakdown of opti-
mization. Pruning and grouping are the time needed to perform
respective optimizations. Checking time represents how long
NuSMV takes to return its results. Parsing time represents the
time needed to generate input files for NuSMV and analyze
its outputs. The time needed for grouping and pruning only
slightly increases as the number of rules increases.
We now evaluate the effects of different numbers of secu-
rity policy attributes and vulnerable attributes, and the result
is shown in the heatmap in Figure 7c. In the heatmap,
the execution time is represented by colors; a darker color
represents a shorter execution time. We fix the number of
automation rules to 500 and randomly select one attribute as
vulnerable. As shown, increasing vulnerable attributes does not
greatly affect SAFECHAIN’s performance, because vulnerable
attributes irrelevant to policy attributes are pruned. Also, as
the number of policy attributes increases, the verification time
increases slightly. The results suggest that SAFECHAIN is fast
enough to support complex security policies.
Privacy leakage. Recall that users can specify what
kinds of information are deemed confidential and check
whether they will be leaked to any vulnerable attributes.
To evaluate the worst-case performance, our evaluation uses
INV AR(aFSMi = a
CLONE
i ) specification for verification,
where aFSMi and a
CLONE
i represent the PUBLIC attributes
ai ∈ A in the original and cloned machines, respectively.
The keyword INV AR is a specialized keyword provided
by NuSMV to check invariance conditions. Each time the
experiment is repeated, we randomly mark an attribute as
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Fig. 8: Performance evaluation for privacy leakage
PRIVATE and another attribute as PUBLIC.
Figure 8a shows the results with and without our op-
timization. Figure 8b shows the comparison between our
optimization and Bounded Model Checking [21] implemented
by NuSMV, and Figure 8c summarizes how much time is spent
during each step. As shown in these figures, time needed for
verifying privacy leakage grows much faster than privilege
escalation because we use two finite state machines to achieve
pairwise comparisons. Nonetheless, these results prove that
SAFECHAIN is still efficient enough to detect attacks in time.
Figure 8d shows SAFECHAIN’s performance with respect
to different numbers of marked attributes. The execution time
is visualized by colors, and a darker color represents a shorter
execution time. The experiment setup is the same as privilege
escalation. We fix the number of automation rules to 500,
randomly choose different numbers of PRIVATE and PUBLIC
attributes, and take the average over 1,000 experiments. The
figure shows that the increase of only PUBLIC or PRIVATE
attributes has little impact on the performance of SAFECHAIN,
because those irrelevant attributes are pruned through opti-
mizations. On the other hand, as the number of both PRIVATE
and PUBLIC attributes increases, the probability of depen-
dency between attributes boosts, and thus fewer attributes can
be pruned. Further, since we built a product machine for
pairwise comparisons of traces, the more attributes left, the
longer time needed for verification. In this case, SAFECHAIN
can still verify 500 automation rules within five seconds and
outperform the baseline without optimizations.
D. Accuracy Evaluation
We evaluate attack detection accuracy of the verification part
only. That is, we assume the devices considered vulnerable are
indeed compromised, and the environment models are accu-
rate. Also, for simplicity, we let window(ai) = possible(ai).
Dataset. Our synthetic dataset shares the same channels and
attributes with those used in §VI-C. In the dataset, the original
triggers and actions are removed, and one trigger and one
action are added for each attribute. The trigger is in the form
of ai = X and the action is ai ← Y . Both X and Y are
configurable parameters.
For each attack class, we conduct two experiments. These
two experiments are designed to ensure that the ground truth
is known, such that we can correctly identify false positives
and false negatives.
The first evaluates the false negative rate of our system.
We first construct an attack chain R1, R2, . . . Rl of length l
randomly, where l is an integer chosen between 2 and 8. If
the action of Ri is “ai ← X”, then the trigger of Ri+1 will be
“ai = X”. We also add another 50 rules, of which the triggers
and actions are randomly chosen.
The second experiment compares SAFECHAIN with previ-
ous work [42] that uses static analysis to show that our system
can avoid false positives in static analysis. The attack chain
is similar to that of the one in the first experiment. The only
difference is that, if action of Ri is “ai ← X”, then the trigger
of Ri+1 will be “ai = Y ” and “X 6= Y .” We expect previous
work to consider such a chain to be exploitable, since they
statically label triggers and actions without considering user-
supplied arguments or attribute values. Note that in this ex-
periment we did not add additional rules to avoid accidentally
forming another attack chain.
We run each experiment 1,000 times. Below we describe
the results and detail configurations (e.g., security policies).
Privilege Escalation We mark the attributes associated with
the trigger of R1 as vulnerable, and the security policy is the
negation of Rl’s action. Rules that are not on the chain are
added with care, so that the last action can only be triggered
through the chain. The results are as expected. SAFECHAIN
reported the attack traces for all the test cases in the first
experiment and verified all test cases as secure in the second
experiment.
Privacy Leakage. We label the attribute associated with the
trigger of R1 as PRIVATE, and the attribute associated with
the action of Rl as PUBLIC. Other attributes are all labeled
OTHER. For the first experiment, SAFECHAIN detects the
attack chain in all 1,000 test cases, which implies that there
is no false negative in our system. For every test case in the
second experiment, our system also reported no attack chain.
The experimental result demonstrates that SAFECHAIN has
no false negative as long as we have an accurate model. It also
shows that our approach outperforms static analysis in specific
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cases, as we take runtime values into account.
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss several research directions to
further improve SAFECHAIN.
Adversary with partial information. To achieve a high level
of security, SAFECHAIN assumes a strong attacker who knows
all of the automation rules specified by users, and thus can also
defend against a weaker attacker who knows only a subset
of the rules. An interesting future direction is to gauge an
automation system’s level of security based on how much
information the attacker needs to launch a successful attack;
it can be considered secure if the attacker is required to know
more than a threshold number (e.g., 100) of automation rules.
Relaxing privacy notions. In this paper, we consider a rela-
tively strict definition of privacy leakage: any two states which
are indistinguishable by attackers should stay indistinguishable
in the future. By satisfying this definition, one can prevent
high-valued attributes from leaking any information to low-
valued variables. This definition is relatively strict because it
does not quantify the amount of information leakage and thus
cannot differentiate a 1-bit leak from a 100-bit leak, despite
the fact that the latter is worse than the former. One interesting
research direction is to consider an analogy of an anonymity
set, and quantify the level of privacy based on the number of
indistinguishable traces on the finite state machine. We leave it
as future work to develop and evaluate such relaxed definitions
of privacy.
Environment modeling. In addition to explicit dependencies
introduced by automation rules, there are implicit dependen-
cies enabled by proximity and environmental changes, which
can also chain automation rules together. For example, the
rule “if the temperature is too low, turn on the heater” seems
to be unrelated to the rule “if the temperature is high enough,
open the window”. However, there might be a hidden relation,
“turning on the heater will increase the temperature”, which is
not explicitly specified in the automation rules, but links the
above two rules together. Another example is that switching
on bulbs can trigger light sensors in the same room but
not in other rooms. Lacking information about such implicit
dependencies may cause false alarms and undetected attacks
due to missing transitions in the finite state machine.
Building an accurate environment model is challenging
even with extensive domain knowledge. SAFECHAIN tries to
mitigate this by focusing on the most likely scenarios in the
near future and frequently re-calibrating based on the current
environment state. While it is impossible to fully model an
environment, SAFECHAIN can benefit from additional infor-
mation that helps reconstruct missing transitions. For example,
additional information (e.g., the location of each device, and
implicit relationships between attributes) can be provided by
the users or automatically discovered by machine learning.
False positives and false negatives. Because each counterex-
ample reported by the model checker is indeed a feasible
attack trace with respect to the model, our scheme should
have no false positives in the ideal case. However, whether
the attack can really be conducted in the real world depends
on how accurately we model the environment. For example,
if an attack can only happen when the temperature is 100◦C,
then it is very likely to be a false positive in the real world.
Inaccurate modeling can also cause false negatives. One
example is when a possible state does not show up in the
model, and the other is missing transitions, such as the case
of implicit dependencies discussed in the previous paragraph.
Another explanation for false negatives is when the model
checker runs out of time. This rarely happens after optimiza-
tion is performed, as our experiment results show.
Tuning the re-checking interval. Because an environment is
non-trivial to model, we decided to re-verify the automation
rules as the environment changes: We first predict how the
environment will evolve during a short period of time, and then
verify the automation rules with respect to this prediction to
make sure attacks cannot be successful momentarily. After the
prediction expires, we make another round of prediction and
verification again. Because a shorter interval indicates a more
accurate environment model, a rule of thumb is setting the
interval to be the maximum time required to perform verifica-
tion, which is about 1s in our implementation. This interval can
be dynamically adjusted according to the verification speed.
Selecting vulnerable devices. Using the vulnerability
database is one approach to determine the devices that are
likely to be vulnerable, which is one of the inputs to our sys-
tem. There are other approaches to achieve this. For example,
users can manually select devices that require high level of
protection, and our system can evaluate whether they may be
attacked by assuming that the other devices are vulnerable.
Because the adversary’s goal is to control an uncompro-
mised device or leak data from an uncompromised device
using automation rules, it is reasonable to consider cases where
some devices are vulnerable and some are not. It is outside
the scope of this work to consider an attacker that controls
all devices, because this attacker succeeds immediately even
without trigger-action rules.
Limitations. The security of our system largely depends on
external sources such as the environment modeling, security
policies and the list of vulnerable devices. The reported 100%
accuracy in the evaluation sections means the system will
never violate the given security policies. However, whether
these policies cover all the security aspects are outside the
scope of our system.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The most closely related studies are discussed in §VI-A.
This section reviews other related work.
End-user programming. Ur et al. [43], [44] investigated
the practicality of end-user programming in the trigger-action
paradigm (“if trigger, then action”) and collected 224,590
rules shared publicly on IFTTT. We borrowed their dataset
for our large-scale evaluation. Mi et al. [36] conducted an
empirical characterization of IFTTT, including its ecosystem,
usage and performance. They ran a self-implemented IFTTT
service in order to demystify the interaction between a partner
service and IFTTT engine. Their results show that the current
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implementation of IFTTT uses a polling method for triggering,
which justifies our assumption in §IV-B.
Securing service provider. DTAP [26] explored the over-
privilege problem in the IFTTT platform and found that 83%
of examined channels lack the support of fine-grained scoping,
and 75% of the tokens are granted more access than required
to support triggers and actions. DTAP then proposed a decen-
tralized trigger-action platform that prevents over-privileged
service providers by using transfer tokens. DTAP addresses
an orthogonal problem, and thus can be directly combined
with our system to further enhance the overall security of
automation platforms.
Intention mismatching. Huang and Cakmak [28] investigated
common inconsistencies human users exhibit when interpret-
ing and creating trigger-action rules. Their results confirm
the need to verify whether the actual behaviors of user-
generated rules match their high-level intentions. By analyzing
corresponding actions, TrigGen [37] automatically suggests
missing triggers in trigger-action rules that are composed
incorrectly by users. Instead of fixing incorrect rules due to
mismatched user intention, our work focuses on identifying
rules that might be exploited when devices are compromised.
Conflict resolution. Ma et al. [33] proposed a watchdog
architecture for detecting and resolving rule conflicts in the
context of smart cities based on simulation. In addition to
achieving conflict detection and resolution, CityGuard [32]
further allows one to specify safety requirements for a city.
These work focus on improving reliability and thus do not
consider the presence of adversaries.
SCADA and IoT. Ca´rdenas et al. [22] studied the security
issues in process control and SCADA systems and proposed
to detect stealthy attacks by incorporating the knowledge of
physical systems. They built a linear model that captures the
nature of the physical system and detect attacks using change
detection algorithms. However, building a precise model for
every physical system is impractical. Hence, our work aims to
model and verify the environment as it changes. To compare
different attack detection approaches under different experi-
ment settings, Urbina et al. [45] proposed a new metric to
quantify attack detection algorithms and found that stateful
detection methods outperform stateless ones.
ContexIoT [29] enhances IoT applications with context-
dependent access control capabilities. ContexIoT checks
whether an action can be executed based on the current
context and asks the user to decide if the context is unclear.
ContexIoT focuses on runtime enforcement; our work is a
prevention system that eliminates potential threats before they
are executed.
ProvThings [46] provides data provenance to diagnose the
trace and root cause of behavior. However, data provenance
is useful only in forensic analysis after an attack. While
ProvThings can be extended to support dynamic policy en-
forcement based on the provenance of system events, which
will notify a user when a possible attack occurs, SAFECHAIN
can detect an attack before it actually happens and prevent it
by removing vulnerable rules.
Temporal logics. Dimitrova et al. [25] proposed SecLTL
and SecCTL to incorporate information flow properties into
temporal logics. These proposed logics suppose a new hide
operator, which can be applied to define privacy on a finite
state machine. SAFECHAIN adopts a similar definition but
also incorporates temporal constraints in the context of smart
spaces. Since our definition can be viewed as a special case of
the previous one, we can express our problem using ordinary
LTL and CTL logics by building a product machine.
IX. CONCLUSION
Finding the right balance between convenience and security
has been a longstanding battle, and SAFECHAIN is the first
attempt to ease this tension in IoT trigger-action programming.
By transforming this programming into a model-checking
problem and formulating the security vulnerabilities into finite
state machines, SAFECHAIN identifies vulnerabilities among
automation rules. To overcome the growing complexity be-
tween IoT devices and automation rules, SAFECHAIN adopts
pruning and grouping to ignore irrelevant devices and combine
equivalent states. We anticipate that SAFECHAIN takes a step
towards securing custom automation rules in IoT for its further
advancement.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF IOT CHANNELS USED
Table VII summarizes the IoT channels used in our exper-
iment.
TABLE VII: 42 IoT Channels Used in the Experiment
Smart phone Android Battery, Android Device, Android Loca-
tion, Android Phone Call, Android Photos, An-
droid Wear, AppZapp, Boxcar 2, Phone Call,
QualityTime
Wearable device Lifelog, Nike+
Smart car Automatic, Dash, Mojio
Security Camera Camio, ManythingDoor Garageio, HomeControl Flex
Appliances
Smart button Bttn, Flic, Qblinks Qmote
Oven GE Appliances Cooking
Water heater GE Appliances GeoSpring
Gardening GreenIQ, Parrot Flower Power
Printer HP Printing
Light bulb LIFX, Lutron Caseta Wireless, ORBneXt, Philips
Hue
Sensors Nest Protect, Netatmo Weather Station
Air conditioner Nest Thermostat
Switch WeMo Insight Switch
Virtual assistant Amazon Alexa
Embedded system Adafruit
Web services Boxoh Package Tracking, ESPN, Instapush, Is It
Christmas?, Printhug
APPENDIX B
DATASET COLLECTED FROM A REAL HOUSEHOLD
We analyzed a real dataset provided by a smart home owner.
The house contains 85 connected devices, including one car,
three alarms, one camera, one energy meter, 24 light bulbs,
nine motion sensors, nine contact sensors, two smartphones,
two presence sensors, 18 switches, four thermostats, six water
sensors and five weather stations. These devices are inter-
connected through about 70 automation rules. Some rules are
designed for security, such as “if a guest arrives, turn on
camera” and “if nobody is at home and any motion has been
detected in the room, make siren sound.” Some are designed
for convenience and power saving, such as “turn off the power
strip when someone is not at home.” The interaction between
devices can be too complex to be reasoned manually.
This dataset demonstrated that the devices used in our
experiments are similar to those being used in a real smart
home. For example, one of the most important categories are
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the safety and security related devices, such as cameras, door
locks, home controls and smoke sensors. We also covered
the most common sensors and actuators such as thermostats,
weather stations, light bulbs and switches.
Upon analyzing the rules in the dataset, we found some
potential attack chains that can be exploited for privilege
escalation. For instance, there is one rule “if any family
member arrives home, switch to HOME mode,” and another
rule “if mode transition to HOME, disarm security cameras.”
By compromising the presence sensor, which might be less
secure, the attacker can create an illusion of someone arrives
home and finally disarm the cameras. Furthermore, when the
mode is switched to HOME, many alarms are also disabled,
for example, the rule “if a door is open, make siren sound and
send me a message” is executed only when current mode is not
HOME. This concludes that it is easy to form attack chains,
especially when the number of rules is large, and attack chains
pose threats to real-world smart home owners.
APPENDIX C
FEASIBILITY OF EXAMPLE RULES USED IN THIS WORK
To verify the feasibility of the example rules used in this
work, we ran a user study. We first extracted rules in Table I
and Table II, and removed highly similar rules (n = 17,
hereafter: Group SAFECHAIN). To mix them with an equal
number of rules sampled from the IFTTT website (Group
Reference), we then used the devices shown in Figure 1 (e.g.,
smart lock) as keywords to collect the first 15 rules displayed
on the returned page for each device. After eliminating dupli-
cates and highly similar rules (e.g., same rules for different
brands) from the obtained 90 rules, we randomly sampled 17
rules and created a survey with 34 rules in total (n = 17 for
Group SAFECHAIN and Group Reference each). There were
no overlapping rules in these two groups.
We created a question for each rule, and the question asked a
participant to rate his/her willingness to use the rule in a Likert
scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree). The rules
were displayed in a randomized order to avoid the sequential
effect.
We recruited 108 participants who have prior experience
with IFTTT rules using Amazon Mechanical Turk. The survey
took approximately 10 minutes and we paid $2.00 for all
participants. After eliminating those who did not have suf-
ficient background knowledge on IFTTT rules, we eventually
obtained 79 valid responses. Most participants (66, 83.5%)
reported to own 1-5 smart home devices, 9 (11.4%) reported
to own 6-10 smart home devices, and 4 (4.7%) participants
reported to own 11-20 devices. Among the 79 valid responses,
the top three popular devices are smart TV (n=36, 45.6%),
smart thermostat (n=16, 20.3%), and smart speaker (n=11,
13.92%). The most popular hubs are Amazon Alexa (47 out of
79) Google assistant (25 out of 79), and Samsung SmartThings
(22 out of 79). 19% of the participants reported themselves
to be extremely experienced and 53.2% report somewhat
experienced with IFTTT. In terms of participant demographics,
36.7% of the participants are females, and the majority of
the participants are between ages 25 and 34 (54.4%, n=43)
and between ages 35 and 44 (24.1%, n=19). 38%, 22.8%
and 15.2% of the 79 participants reported to hold a highest
degree in bachelor degree, master degree, and some college,
respectively.
Based on their responses, we examined the willingness level
of individual users as well as combinations of users. We used
a T-test to check if these two groups of rules have significant
mean difference, and we found some significant difference
(t(78) = −6.04, p < .0001). This result suggests that users are
more willing to use the rules in Group Reference than Group
SAFECHAIN, which is reasonable because Group SAFECHAIN
intentionally includes potential attack chains for demonstration
purposes. Based on this result, we are unable to show that
people may adopt the rules in Group SAFECHAIN in practice.
Hence, we performed further analysis and found that 78.5%,
45.6%, 67.7% and 70.9% of participants are willing (with a
Likert score of 3 or higher) to use the four chained rules in
Table I, respectively. This result shows that a large percentage
of users may adopt rules that lead to unintentional chained
effects in practice.
In addition, IFTTT rules may be created by multiple users
that share the same living/working space. To check the will-
ingness to use with multiple users (say a 3-person family), we
enumerated all possible combinations of three participants and
examined their aggregated willingness by taking the maximum
(out of the three) of the Likert scale values. We found that 78%
of the combinations of the 3 participants would be willing
(with a Likert score of 3 or higher) to use all the rules in
Group SAFECHAIN, while 91% of the combinations of the
three participants will be willing to use all the rules in Group
Reference. In short, this user study results imply that while
the rules in Group SAFECHAIN are less appealing than Group
Reference to individual users, the likelihood of three or more
users in a group to use all the rules in Group SAFECHAIN
remains high, implying the practicality of these rules for the
real-world scenarios.
